تأملی بر نسبت میان حمایت از اقلیت‌ها و صلح و امنیت منطقه‌ای در اسلام و حقوق بین‌الملل

حفظ صلح و امنیت بین­المللی جز از طریق تأمین صلح و امنیت منطقه­ای که آن هم خود منوط به وجود ثبات و امنیت در جوامع داخلی است، ناشدنی به نظر می­رسد. فراز و فرودهای تاریخ حاکی از آن است که حمایت از اقلیت­ها برای تأمین ثبات، صلح و امنیت بین­المللی ضروری بوده و تبعیض علیه اشخاص متعلق به این گروه­ها، همواره ثبات داخلی و صلح و امنیت منطقه­ای و بین­المللی را در معرض خطرات جدی قرارداده است.  فلسفه وجودی اصلی تشریع عقد ذمه در دین اسلام، همانا ایجاد همزیستی مسالمت­آمیز میان اقلیت­های دینی و اکثریت مسلمان در جامعه اسلامی است. همچنین، هدف ابزاری نظام حمایت از حقوق اقلیت­ها، پیشگیری از جنگ و درگیری میان اشخاص متعلق به اقلیت­ها و گروه­های اکثریت کشورهای مختلف در پرتو حفظ یکپارچگی سرزمینی دولت­ها و در نتیجه حفظ صلح و امنیت منطقه­ای و بین­المللی است؛ پس برای تأمین صلح و امنیت منطقه­ای، باید از اقلیت­ها حمایت به عمل آورد و بهره­مندی این گروه­ها از حقوق خویش را تضمین نمود. نگارندگان در این نوشته بر این باورند که حمایت از اقلیت­ها و تضمین حقوق آن­ها در حقوق بین­الملل و تأسی به رویکرد اسلامیِ مبتنی بر زیست جمعیِ مسالمت­جویانه گروه­های مختلف اجتماعی، به مثابه راه‌کاری اصولی و پیشگیرانه در برابرِ  بروز منازعات قومی، در تحقق صلح و امنیت منطقه­ای، از اهمیتی حیاتی برخوردار است.

مقاله مشترک استاد گرامی جناب آقای "دکتر مصطفی فضایلی" و آقای "موسی کرمی" پژوهشگر و کارشناس ارشد حقوق بین الملل دانشگاه قم در فصلنامه پژوهش های تطبیقی حقوق اسلام و غرب به چاپ رسید. برای مطالعه این اثر ارزشمند به اینجا وارد شوید. 

قانونگذاری در فضای سایبر: رویکرد حقوق بین الملل و حقوق ایران

 

از بدو ورود فضای سایبر به زندگی بشریت، مقوله قانونگذاری و شناخت قانونگذار صالح در این فضا، چالش جدی بوده است. شیوه قانونگذاری در فضای سایبر، مبتنی بر دو نوع نگرش متفاوت به حاکمیت در فضای سایبر است. نگرش نخست، مبتنی بر انحصار دولت­ها در عرصه قانونگذاری فضای سایبر است و نگرش دوم که ملهم از دکترین میراث مشترک بشریت است، مخالف ورود انحصاری دولت­ها به این عرصه است. هر یک از این دو رویکرد، موجد روش‌های قانونگذاری مختلفی در فضای سایبر است. روش‌های قانونگذاری ملی، بین‌المللی و خودانتظامی در زمره روش­های قانونگذاری در فضای سایبر به شمار می‌آیند. اگرچه توسل به هر یک از روش­های قانونگذاری با اشکالاتی در عرصه اجرا روبه‌روست، در این میان می‌توان رویکردی بینابین و مختلط را برگزید تا ضمن رفع نواقص دیگر روش­ها، زمینه را برای نیل به تفاهم میان کشورها و گروه­های فعال در زمینه فضای سایبر هموار سازد. نگرش دولت جمهوری اسلامی ایران، اساساً مبتنی بر شیوه قانونگذاری ملی است. بااین­حال، عملکرد ایران در سطح بین‌المللی و به ­ویژه در اتحادیه بین‌المللی مخابرات، حاکی از پذیرش روش مختلط در قانونگذاری در فضای سایبر است. 

مقاله "قانونگذاری در فضای سایبر: رویکرد حقوق بین الملل و حقوق ایران" اثر مشترک اینجانب و استاد گرامی جناب آقای دکتر سیدیاسر ضیایی در شماره جدید مجله حقوقی بین الملل به چاپ رسید. بدین وسیله از زحمات و تلاش مهربانانه و بی دریغ استاد عزیز جناب آقای دکتر ضیایی کمال سپاسگزاری را دارم. اصل مقاله را می توانید از این لینک دریافت نمای

اقلیت های قومی در ایران یا اقوام ایرانی

با توجه به رویه قضایی و دکترین حقوقی بین المللی، با امعان نظر در ترکیب جمعیتی و ساختار سیاسی-اجتماعی-فرهنگی کشور ایران و با عنایت به شمای قومیتی و نظام حقوقی جمهوری اسلامی ایران، هیچ یک از گروههای قومی کشور را نمیتوان «اقلیت قومی» در معنای خاص آن دانست و گروههای قومیِ موجود در ایران را باید با عنوان «اقوام ایرانی» مورد اشاره قرار داد و نه «اقلیتهای قومی در ایران». تنوع قومیِ پهنه ی فرهنگی ایران میتواند به عنوان یک امتیاز در جهت تقویت فرهنگ ملی محسوب گردد؛ زیرا در نهایت فرهنگ ملی کشورمان، رشد و غنای خود را وامدار فرهنگهای اقوام مختلف تشکیل دهنده ی خویش است.

مقاله "اقلیت های قومی در ایران یا اقوام ایرانی از نگاهی ژورنالیستی تا دیدگاهی حقوقی" اثر مشترک استاد گرانقدر جناب آقای "دکتر مصطفی فضایلی" دانشیار حقوق بین الملل دانشگاه قم و "موسی کرمی" دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق بین الملل دانشگاه قم در مجله مطالعات حقوقی به چاپ رسید. برای مشاهده به نشانی زیر بروید.

http://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_4555.html

سلـب تابـعیت از نگاه حقوق اسـلام و نظـام بین المـللی حقـوق بشـر

امروزه تابعیت، یک حق بنیادین بشری، بستر هویت، زمینه‌ساز حفظ کرامت انسانی و برخورداری از عدالت و امنیت برای افراد به‌شمار می‌رود. سلب تابعیت، پیامدهای ویرانگری چون فقدان حمایت حقوقی، نداشتن حق مشارکت در امور عمومی و فرایندهای سیاسی، دسترسی ناکافی به مراقبت‌های بهداشتی و آموزش، ضعف در اشتغال و استخدام، شانس اندک برای کسب مالکیت، محدودیت‌های مسافرتی، محرومیت اجتماعی، ابتلا به فقر، آسیب‌پذیری در برابر قاچاق انسان، و آزار و اذیت و خشونت را برای فردِ سلب تابعیت‌شده به‌همراه خواهد داشت. هرچند همانطور که گفته شد اعطا و سلب تابعیت به عنوان امر حاکمیتی در اختیار دولت هاست، اما با توجه به  اینکه در درجه اول سلب آن که موضوع بحث ماست منجر به عواقب ناگوار در نقض حقوق بشر می گردد و دوم  آنکه غالبا با تمایلات سیاسی حکومت هایی که دارای محمل قوی ملی نیستند صورت می گیرد ( همانطور که اخیرا در مورد شیخ عیسی قاسم در بحرین صورت گرفته است) می طلبد تا دامنه اختیار حکومت و زمینه های جواز و عدم جواز آن بررسی گردد.از‌این‌رو زمینه‌های این اقدامباید به صورت کاملاً مضیق تفسیر شود. در نظام حقوقی اسلام نیز سلب تابعیت تنها در تابعیت قراردادی و آن‌هم فقط در مواردی که افراد تعهدات خود بر مبنای قرارداد ذمه را نقض کرده ‌باشند امکان‌پذیر و مجاز است. مقالۀ حاضر که نگاشته استاد ارجمند دکتر مصطفی فضایلی ( دانشیار حقوق بین الملل دانشگاه قم) و آقای موسی کرمی ( دانش آموخته حقوق بین الملل دانشگاه قم) می باشد ( در دوره 8 مجله حقوق تطبیقی دانشگاه تهران چاپ شده است ) بر آن است تا با روش توصیفی- تحلیلی به واکاوی رویکرد نظام حقوقی اسلام و نظام بین‌المللی حقوق بشر نسبت به سلب تابعیت بپردازد.

 اصل مقاله (308 K)

The (Il?)legality of Nuclear Weapons Tests Under International Law

The (Il?)legality of Nuclear Weapons Tests Under International Law—Filling the Possible Legal Gap by Ensuring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s Entry into Force

Issue: 4 Volume: 21

By: Daniel Rietiker

Date: March 16, 2017

Introduction

Two nuclear weapons test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2016 brought the topic of nuclear testing under international law to the fore again in the year that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the most relevant international instrument in this field, was supposed to be celebrating the twentieth anniversary of its adoption. Recent missile tests by the DPRK in February and March of this year have also highlighted concerns over the state’s nuclear program and increased anxiety in the region.[1] Further tensions can be expected from the already complicated relations with Russia. Indeed, in an interview with Arms Control Today at the beginning of 2016, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry declared the following:

First of all, let me say that I don’t have any inside information from anybody in the Russian government . . . . It’s just that I know they are developing new nuclear weapons. They’ve said so themselves. I’m confident that that will lead the weapons designers to request new tests. That will put [Russian President Vladimir] Putin up to a decision. . . . One of the reasons the political costs will not be as high as they should be is because we have not yet ratified the CTBT. That makes a decision to test easier for him.[2]

These recent events and statements raise the question of the legality of potential nuclear tests under international law, which will be examined in the following Insight.

The Legal Norms Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons Tests

Nuclear testing has fortunately become rare in recent years. Only the DPRK has tested nuclear weapons in this century, namely on Oct. 9, 2006; May 25, 2009; Feb. 12, 2013; Jan. 6, 2016; and Sept. 9, 2016.[3] The legal norms restricting states’ freedom to conduct nuclear tests are mainly established by the treaties discussed below.

Early Treaties

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT or the Moscow Treaty), a product of the Cold War, was negotiated and concluded in the aftermath of the Berlin crises of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.[4] It was adopted on August 5, 1963, as a tripartite agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and entered into force on October 10, 1963.[5] 126 states have ratified this treaty to date, including India, Israel, and Pakistan.[6] The DPRK, in contrast, is not a party.

The PTBT only prohibits a “nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.”[7] Consequently, states parties would not be prevented from conducting underground tests unless they cause transboundary fallout.

The PTBT’s most important weakness lies in its lack of implementation provisions, making it more difficult for an independent statement to be made about a possible breach.[8] Also, a party can denounce this treaty on the basis of a withdrawal clause:

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.[9]

Even though this clause sets certain limits, its language is vague and the applicable criteria broad, conceding a wide margin of appreciation to the states parties.[10]

The United States and the USSR agreed on further mutual restraint, prohibiting underground tests exceeding 150 kilotons.[11] Being of limited scope, it also contains a similar withdrawal clause to the PTBT.

Additionally, states have ratified instruments prohibiting nuclear testing in the context of denuclearizing certain zones and regions.[12] Russia, for instance, is bound by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty[13] and Protocol No. 3 to the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Rarotonga Treaty) by which Russia, like the other four states recognized under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as possessing nuclear weapons,[14] have agreed not to test nuclear weapons within the zone.[15]

1996 CTBT

Status of the Treaty

The UN General Assembly adopted the CTBT on September 10, 1996.[16] It contains a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, even though it does not proscribe nuclear weapons testing by way of computer simulations or conducting so-called sub-critical tests (i.e. those not resulting in nuclear explosions).[17]

Unfortunately, the CTBT has not yet entered into force in spite of the current 164 ratifications.[18] Under Article XIV, all states with nuclear power and/or research reactors, as listed in its Annex 2, have to ratify the treaty before it enters into force. The vast majority of those states have done so, including the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, but the CTBT still must be ratified by China, the DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States.[19]

Legal Effects of the CTBT—The Example of Russia

The question arises whether states such as Russia, seventeen years after its ratification in 2000, are still bound by the CTBT. A legal analysis of this question starts from Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The customary nature of this provision is well recognized.[20] According to Article 18(a), “a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.” Article 18(b) imposes the same duty on a state that “has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.”

What do those provisions mean in concrete terms for Russia? Two questions have to be addressed: First, what kind of act would defeat the “object and purpose” of the CTBT and, second, what does “unduly delayed” mean?

Acts that run counter to CTBT Article I(1) (Basic Obligations), would certainly defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Under that provision, a “State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.” In other words, a new nuclear test (by Russia for instance) would not per se breach the CTBT, but it might violate Article 18 VCLT.[21]

The question of whether the CTBT’s entry into force has been “unduly delayed” is more difficult to answer. In the absence of a precise temporal indication in Article 18(b) VCLT and due to the fact that proposals to introduce such indications had been rejected during the preparatory work for the VCLT,[22] the term “unduly delayed” has to be construed with flexibility, taking into account the particular circumstances. It is noteworthy to mention that both states that have ratified the CTBT as well as some states that have signed the CTBT have confirmed at the biannual conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT their commitment not to act counter to the object and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force.[23]

It is fair to conclude that the CTBT’s entry into force, after so many years, has been “unduly delayed.” Such a conclusion may be deduced from the particular nature of arms control treaties. In fact, they are often considered “interdependent treaties” based on a strong reciprocity between states parties.[24] Once this critical balance is defeated, the continuation of treaty implementation by other states might no longer be expected for reasons of justice and equality.[25] In other words, states such as Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, when ratifying the CTBT, might have had legitimate expectations that the United States, China, and others would follow on the same path.

As indicated above, Article 18(a) VCLT contains the same obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty for states, such as the United States, that have signed but not ratified the CTBT, for the period between signature and actual ratification of the treaty. There is no condition of “unduly delayed” here, but the states can demonstrate their intention not to become parties. While the United States was instrumental in negotiating the CTBT,[26] it has not ratified it yet, although the Obama administration constantly stressed its support for the treaty.[27] The treaty is, however, not likely to receive strong support from the Trump administration.

Other Sources of International Law

International law, including arms control law, is not restricted to treaties. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates the sources of international law, listing “international conventions,” “international custom,” “general principles of law,” as well as “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.” Regarding nuclear weapons tests, it has been suggested that customary international law might come into play, at least regarding atmospheric, underwater, outer space, and celestial bodies testing, thanks mainly to the relevance of environmental protection in modern international law.[28] George Bunn, the first general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, advocated in an article published in 1999 that a norm against nuclear testing already existed, at least a “politically” binding one, even without the CTBT’s entry into force.[29] He based his conclusion on the practice of states (including national moratoria), the reasons given in support of their behavior, and international condemnation of nuclear testing.[30]

In the absence of a legally binding court decisions establishing such a customary rule, Russia or other states willing to test nuclear weapons might nevertheless rather easily plead the contrary. This is even more so in the case of underground testing, even though state practice seems to have remained largely consistent for many years with only the DPRK having carried out such tests, as mentioned above.

What else, from a strictly legal point of view, could prevent Russia or other states from resuming nuclear testing? The UN Security Council (UNSC) has repeatedly condemned the DPRK’s nuclear tests and qualified them as a threat to peace and international security.[31] On the other hand, it did not, as such, qualify them as a breach of international law. In comparison, in resolutions concerning the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the UNSC used clear and explicit language, for example, in Resolution 2118 in 2013 condemning “in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the attack on 21 August 2013, in violation of international law” (emphasis added).

Finally, in a resolution adopted on September 23, 2016, thus only some days after the twentieth anniversary of the CTBT, the UNSC reiterated the importance of its entry into force.[32] Without underestimating the political significance of this resolution, it is suggested here that the UNSC did not declare nuclear weapons tests per se illegal under international law.

Conclusions

The legality of nuclear tests is not certain under international law, and the relevant sources of international law are incomplete and fragmentary. The question of legality depends on the concrete circumstances of the test, in particular the environment—underground, atmospheric, outer space, under water, and transboundary. Certain treaties establish a clear prohibition, but they are limited and contain withdrawal clauses. Moreover, in spite of the high number of ratifications and the fact that the CTBT’s preparatory commission established its structure many years ago and has started its verification activities, the CTBT is still not in force and needs the ratification of several key states. In this situation, it is also uncertain whether Article 18 VCLT is still pertinent. Finally, it cannot be asserted convincingly that a general prohibition of nuclear weapons testing derives from other sources of international law.

The moment to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the CTBT would have been in 2016. It is in the hands of a few states, especially the United States, to save the treaty, since it is generally considered that its ratification would trigger a virtuous circle pushing China and then other states to ratify as well.[33]

About the Author: PhD, lecturer at the University of Lausanne, Member of the Adjunct Faculty, Suffolk University Law School, Visiting Fellow Harvard Law School in 2014. The author thanks James Brannan and John Burroughs for their valuable input on this article.

 

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[1] North Korea: Four Ballistic Missiles Fired into Sea, BBC (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39175704.

[2] Daniel Horner & Kingston Reif, Lowering Nuclear Risks: An Interview With Former Defense Secretary William Perry, Arms Control Association (Jan./Feb. 2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_0102/Features/Interviews/Lowering-Nuclear-Risks-An-Interview-With-Former-Defense-Se....

[3] Nuclear Testing 1945 – Today, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).

[4] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S 44, [hereinafter Partial Test Ban Treaty], available athttps://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf/.

[5] G. Venturini, Test-Bans and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, in Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law, Vol. I, 138 (J.L. Black-Branch & D. Fleck eds., 2014).

[6] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban# (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).

[7] Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 4, art. I, para. 1.

[8] Venturini, supra note 5, at 135.

[9] Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 4, art. I, para. 2.

[10] In spite of the openness of this type of clause, there are only few examples where states made use of them. See Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea’s Withdrawal From The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ASIL Insights (Jan. 24, 2003), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/2/north-koreas-withdrawal-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty.

[11] Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests art. I, U.S.-Russ., July 3, 1974, 13 ILM 906, available athttp://www.state.gov/t/isn/5204.htm#treaty.

[12] See, in particular, Article 1, para 1 of the Tlatelolco Treaty (nuclear-weapon-free zone for Latin America); Article 3, para 1(c) of the Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia); Article 5(a) of the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa); and Article 5(a) of the Semipalatinsk Treaty (Central Asia).

[13] The Antarctic Treaty art. 5, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 UNTS 71.

[14] For  the  purposes  of  the NPT,  a nuclear weapon state is one that has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to Jan. 1, 1967.

[15] Protocol No. 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty art. 1, Apr. 14, 1997, 1971 UNTS 482.

[16] G.A. Res. 50/245, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Sept. 17, 1996).

[17] Venturini, supra note 5, at 145.

[18] CTBTO Preparatory Commission, https://www.ctbto.org/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).

[19] Status of Signature and Ratification, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).

[20] Venturini supra note 5, at 148. As a result, states such as the United States that have not ratified this treaty are nevertheless legally bound.

[21] See Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (Sept. 15, 2016), available athttp://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/P5_en.pdf. The Security Council also references this statement in S.C. Res. 2310 (Sept. 23, 2016).

[22] A proposal by Argentina, Ecuador, and Uruguay introducing a delay of not more than twelve months was rejected During the Vienna Conference. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 131, A/CONF.39/1 l/Add.2 (1971).

[23] The first of these conferences was held in Vienna in 1999 and the last one in New York, on Sept. 29, 2015.

[24] See, e.g., Daniel Rietiker, Some Thoughts on Article VI NPT and Its Customary Nature, Arms Control Law (June 10, 2014),  http://armscontrollaw.com/2014/06/10/some-thoughts-on-article-vi-npt-and-its-customary-nature/.

[25] See, for this kind of treaty, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60 § 2(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679.

[26] George Bunn, The Status of Norms against Nuclear Testing, The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1999, at 20.

[27] See Importance of CTBT Stressed at NPT Prepcom, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/importance-of-ctbt-stressed-at-npt-prepcom/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).

[28] Venturini, supra note 5, at 151.

[29] Bunn, supra note 26, at 29.

[30] Id.

[31] See S.C. Res. 2270 (Mar. 2, 2016).

[32] S.C. Res. 2310 (Sept. 23, 2016).

[33] John Carlson, Nonproliferation Benefits of India Deal Remain Elusive, Arms Control Today (June 2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_06/Features/Nonproliferation-Benefits-of-India-Deal-Remain-Elusive.

The American Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples

The American Declaration on The Rights of

Indigenous Peoples

Issue: 7 Volume: 21

By: Stefania Errico

Date: June 22, 2017

On June 15, 2016, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, after decades of laborious negotiations.[1]

Adopted almost ten years after the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the American Declaration addresses issues that were not covered by UNDRIP, including specific situations relevant to the region such as the rights of indigenous peoples in “voluntary isolation or initial contact,” and indigenous peoples affected by armed conflict.[2] It also strengthens UNDRIP’s provisions concerning indigenous peoples’ treaty rights, which are particularly relevant to the Americas in ways that have been regarded as a “major victory” by some indigenous peoples of the hemisphere. However, in other areas the Declaration falls short of meeting the standards that have been set in UNDRIP or have been developed by the regional human rights institutions.

Comprised of forty-one articles divided into six thematic sections, the American Declaration recognizes a wide-ranging series of individual and collective rights deemed “indispensable for [indigenous peoples’] existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.”[3] According to Article XLI, these rights constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity, and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. In keeping with the approach commonly followed in the other instruments concerning indigenous peoples, the Declaration does not provide any definition of the term “indigenous peoples.” Rather, it relies on the criterion of self-identification according to the “practices and institutions of each indigenous people” in order to define its scope of application.[4]

Self-Determination, Autonomy, and Participation

In its Preamble, the Declaration reproduces some paragraphs of UNDRIP and recalls the historic injustices suffered by indigenous peoples, the urgent need to respect and promote their inherent rights, and the importance of eliminating all forms of discrimination against them. Strikingly, however, it does not acknowledge indigenous peoples as peoples “equal to all other peoples,” as UNDRIP had done, making explicit the link between indigenous groups as peoples and the right to self-determination. By doing that, UNDRIP acknowledges that indigenous peoples, like other peoples, have a full right to exercise self-determination, including in its external dimension, should the conditions be met.[5]

A similar statement is not found in the American Declaration, which merely states that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, borrowing language from common Article 1 of the UN Covenants on Human Rights and Article 3 of UNDRIP, and lays down that in exercising this right, indigenous peoples have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, reproducing Article 4 of UNDRIP.[6] This right is understood as a right to internal self-determination, in accordance also with the limits formulated in Article IV to safeguard “the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.”

Throughout the various thematic sections, the Declaration thus provides for the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their juridical, social, political, and economic systems or institutions, to have their indigenous law and legal systems recognized and respected, to promote and develop their “systems and media of communication,” to maintain their own health systems and practices, to establish and control their education systems and institutions, and to determine their priorities for development and design policies, plans, programmes and strategies accordingly.[7] Echoing Article 18 of UNDRIP, the Declaration also recognizes, at Article XXI, indigenous peoples’ right to maintain and develop their own decision-making institutions and to participate in decision-making in matters that would affect their rights. Additionally, the Declaration states that indigenous peoples have the right to equal opportunities to access and participate fully and effectively as peoples in all national institutions and fora, including deliberative bodies.[8]

Yet, the Declaration does not fully follow the dual approach, resting on the principles of self-government and participation as expressions of indigenous peoples’ self-determination that underpins UNDRIP. Article XXIII seems to narrow the scope of indigenous peoples’ participation to “matters which affect their rights and which are related to the development and execution of laws, public policies, programmes, plans and actions related to indigenous matters.” Moreover, Article XXIII limits their participation and consultation by presenting these concepts in the context of “contributions of the indigenous legal and organizational systems.” By contrast, as the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples noted when referring to the provisions in UNDRIP and other international instruments and related jurisprudence, indigenous peoples shall be involved in decision-making processes “whenever a State decision may affect indigenous peoples in ways not felt by others in society.” This may occur “when the interests or conditions of indigenous peoples that are particular to them are implicated in the decision, even when the decision may have a broader impact, as in the case of certain legislation.”[9]

Consultation and Free, Prior, and Informed Consent

The Declaration reiterates Articles 19 and 32.2 of UNDRIP, providing for states to consult and cooperate in good faith with indigenous peoples through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them, and prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.[10] However, contrary to UNDRIP, the Declaration does not provide for consultation with the indigenous peoples concerned before using their lands or territories for military activities .[11] Nor does it make indigenous peoples’ consent a requirement in the case of relocation and storage or disposal of hazardous materials in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples.[12] In this regard, it should be recalled that in the view of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) the state has a duty to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples in the case of large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major impact within indigenous peoples’ territories.[13] The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has also recognized that indigenous peoples’ consent is required in the case of displacement and storage or disposal of hazardous materials.[14]

Land, Territories, and Resources

The Declaration acknowledges indigenous peoples’ right to cultural integrity, including the recognition and respect for their ways of life, and more specifically, their distinctive relationship with their lands, territories, and resources, and recognizes their right to maintain and strengthen this relationship.[15] Quoting Article 26 of UNDRIP, the Declaration recognizes indigenous peoples’ rights to “own, use, develop and control” their lands, territories, and resources. It also introduces a new paragraph whose meaning is somewhat unclear, providing for the legal recognition of forms of property, possession, and ownership “in accordance with the legal system of each State and the relevant international instruments.” The foundation of indigenous peoples’ rights to their land lies in their traditional occupation and use of their territory, and this right exists regardless of whether it is officially recognized by the state.[16] The new paragraph may be directed at accommodating varying national regimes governing land and natural resources, including those cases in which the state retains the ownership of certain natural resources as expressly contemplated in ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) (ILO C169), at Article 15. However, whereas ILO C169 safeguards indigenous peoples’ ability to participate in the benefits arising out of the exploration and exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands, the Declaration provides no such right.[17] Furthermore, unlike UNDRIP, the Declaration does not contemplate the right of indigenous peoples to redress, including restitution, for the lands, territories, and resources that they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used and that were confiscated, taken, occupied, used, or damaged without their free, prior, and informed consent. Again, redress, including restitution, has been recognized by the IACtHR as an essential element of indigenous peoples’ land rights.[18]

Treaties, Agreements, and Other Constructive Arrangements

Closely linked to self-determination and land rights are the provisions concerning treaties, agreements, and other constructive arrangements. As has been mentioned above, the Declaration includes a stronger provision than UNDRIP, establishing the principle that these shall be recognized and enforced “in accordance with their true spirit and intent in good faith” and providing for the submission of related disputes to regional and international bodies.[19]

In conclusion, the Declaration has been considered a “historic step” for the recognition, promotion, and protection of indigenous peoples’ rights in the continent, a sign of the commitment of OAS member states in this regard, and an important guiding instrument to support OAS organs in the implementation of their mandates, notably the IACtHR and the IACHR.[20] The Declaration recognizes that the rights of indigenous peoples are “essential to the present and future of the Americas” and calls upon states to promote the adoption of legislative and other measures to give effect to it, with the full participation of indigenous peoples.[21] It also invites the OAS to take all necessary measures for its promotion.[22] Whereas, for certain aspects, the Declaration may fall short of meeting the standards already set in other international instruments and those developed by the regional human rights institutions, Article XL states that nothing in the Declaration shall be construed as diminishing or extinguishing rights that indigenous peoples now have or may acquire in the future. Indeed, as stressed by the IACHR and the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Declaration shall be read in conjunction with UNDRIP, ILO C169, and other international and regional human rights instruments.[23]

About the Author: Stefania Errico is an Honorary Research Fellow, Coventry University, Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience.

 

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[1] The adoption of the Declaration was accompanied by the objection of the United States, and the “non-position” of Canada.  The Government of Colombia declared unacceptable the provisions concerning free, prior and informed consent (Arts. XXIII, para.2; and XXIX, para.4) and military activities (Art. XXX, para. 5). American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, AG/RES.2888 (XLVI-O/16) (June 15, 2016), available at http://cdn7.iitc.org/wp-content/uploads/AG07150E06_web.pdf [hereinafter American Declaration].

[2] Id. arts. XXVI, XXX.

[3] Id. art. VI. In addition to the issues discussed here and other issues previously addressed in other agreements, the Declaration includes previously unaddressed issues involving indigenous family, gender equality, juridical personality, internal and international armed conflicts, and indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation or initial contact. It furthermore places a particular emphasis on the provision of intercultural social services. See, id. arts. XV, XVIII.

[4] Id. art. I.

[5] See Stefania Errico, The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Overview, 7 Human Rights L. Rev. 741 (2007); S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (2009).

[6] American Declaration, supra note 1, arts. III, XXI.

[7] Id. arts. VI,XXII; XXII, para. 2; XIV, para. 3; XVIII, para. 2; XV, para. 3; XXIX.

[8] Id. art. XXI, para. 2.

[9] James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people), Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 43 (July 15, 2009), available at http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/annual/2009_hrc_annual_report_en.pdf.

[10] American Declaration, supra note 1, arts. XXIII, para. 2, XXIX, para. 4.

[11] See id. art. XXX, para. 5.

[12] See id. art. XIX, para. 2.

[13] See also Stefania Errico, Control over Natural Resources and Protection of the Environment of Indigenous Territories, in The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (Weller and Jessie Hohmann eds., 2017). See also Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134 (Aug. 12, 2008).

[14]  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc 56/09, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., ¶¶ 334(1), (3) (2009), available athttp://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/pdf/ancestrallands.pdf.

[15] American Declaration, supra note 1, arts. XIII, XXV.

[16] See, e.g., Int’l Labour Org. [ILO] Observation (CEACR), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) - Peru (Ratification: 1994), (2002); Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79 (2001).

[17] The IACtHR has held that benefit sharing is a form of just compensation under Article 21 of the Inter-American Convention in the case of restrictions on indigenous peoples’ land rights. See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 157 (2012).

[18] See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128 (2006).

[19]  American Declaration, supra note 1, art. XXIV.

[20] See IACHR Press Release, The IACHR Celebrates the Adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (June 22, 2016), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2016/082.asp [hereinafter IACHR Press Release].

[21] American Declaration, supra note 1, art. XXXI.

[22] Id. Art. XXXVIII.

[23] See, IACHR Press Release, supra note 20; Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixteenth Session, U.N. Doc. E/2017/43-E/C.19/2017/11, ¶ 19 (2017).

بررسی مشروعیت عملکرد ائتلاف ضد داعش(دولت اسلامی عراق و شام) از منظر حقوق بین الملل در سوریه

بررسی مشروعیت عملکرد ائتلاف ضد داعش(دولت اسلامی عراق و شام) از منظر حقوق بین الملل در سوریه

سید احمد طباطبایی¹؛ زهرا سادات شارق  ²

¹استاد حقوق بین‌الملل پردیس فارابی دانشگاه تهران، قم

²دانشجوی کارشناسی‌ارشد حقوق بین‌الملل پردیس فارابی دانشگاه تهران، قم

چکیده

آغاز حملات هوایی ائتلاف ضد داعش به رهبری ایالات‌ متحده به مواضع گروه تروریستی داعش، در سرزمین عراق و سوریه بحث مشروعیت عملکرد این ائتلاف در سوریه را، از منظر حقوق بین‌الملل در مکاتب حقوقی مطرح ساخت. ائتلاف مذکور تلاش می‌کند تا با استناد به اصول و تئوری‌های حقوق بین‌الملل از جمله دفاع مشروع، دکترین ناتوانی و عدم تمایل در صدد توجیه عملیات نظامی خود در دولت سوریه برآید، اما در آخر، قطعنامۀ شورای امنیت تکلیف را روشن می‌کند. در این اوضاع و احوال شورای امنیت با صدور قطعنامۀ 2249 (2015) پس از تأکید بر حاکمیت و تمامیت سرزمینی دولت‌های عراق و سوریه و اینکه داعش تهدیدی جهانی و بی‌سابقه علیه صلح و امنیت جهانی است، بدون آنکه به‌صراحت اجازۀ توسل به زور علیه آن را بدهد، از توسل به آن علیه داعش حمایت می‌کند. هدف از مقالۀ حاضر بررسی مهم‌ترین استدلالات برای مشروعیت عملکرد ائتلاف، یعنی دفاع مشروع و قطعنامه‌های شورای امنیت است.

برای دریافت فایل این مقاله اینجا کلیک نمایید

مشروعیت یا عدم مشروعیت آزمایش از سلاح های هسته ای در حقوق بین الملل- پر نمودن خلاهای قانونی با تضمین

The (Il?)legality of Nuclear Weapons Tests Under International Law—Filling the Possible Legal Gap by Ensuring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s Entry into Force

 

Issue: 4, Volume: 21

By: 

Daniel Rietiker

Date: March 16, 2017

Introduction

Two nuclear weapons test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2016 brought the topic of nuclear testing under international law to the fore again in the year that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the most relevant international instrument in this field, was supposed to be celebrating the twentieth anniversary of its adoption. Recent missile tests by the DPRK in February and March of this year have also highlighted concerns over the state’s nuclear program and increased anxiety in the region. Further tensions can be expected from the already complicated relations with Russia. Indeed, in an interview with Arms Control Today at the beginning of 2016, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry declared the following:

 

 

ادامه نوشته

بازگشت دوباره

 

 

پس از دوره ای رکو نسبی و عدم بروز شدن این وبلاگ سعی بر بروز نمودن آن با تحلیل حقوقی اخبار روز و اخبار حقوق بین الملل و همچنین مسائل مربوط به کار در حوزه حقوق بین الملل و قراردادهای بین المللی به صورت تخصصی داریم .... ان شاالله که در این مسیر ما را با نقطه نظرات و همکاری و همراهی خویش مساعدت فرمایید.